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THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION IN MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM UNDER THE AMLO 
ADMINISTRATION 
By 
Ava Ibanez* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Prior to the adoption of international arbitration, conflicts arose to determine what 
governing law would rule in international disputes, and the differences of law and traditions 
between sovereign nations exacerbated the conflict.1 However, international arbitration 
balanced the legal differences between nations, and thus, provided a reliable adjudicatory 
process for international contractual disputes that prioritized the interests of the parties 
instead of the legal systems of each sovereign.2 Essentially, international arbitration 
allowed parties to circumvent the complexity of the law of different nations by providing 
an enforceable method of dispute resolution based on contractual agreements approved by 
both parties.3 International arbitration not only supports foreign investment, it encourages 
it.4 In fact, global commerce as we know it today may not have been possible without the 
inception of international commercial arbitration.5 And, as will be discussed herein, 
Mexico’s energy reform would also not have been possible without the aid that arbitration 
provides to international dispute resolution. 
Notwithstanding the obvious advantages of international commercial arbitration, 
Latin-American countries have been some of the most arbitration-reluctant nations in the 
world.6 This hesitation stems from political disorder and distrust in other nations, which 
usually results in Latin-American countries imposition of sovereign immunities to 
international agreements.7 Foreign investors are, therefore, less protected from having to 
litigate solely under the law of a foreign nation, which renders international investment a 
risky endeavor in Latin-America.8 Mexico’s energy reform serves as an example of a 
 
* Ava Ibanez is the Foreign Decisional Editor of The Arbitration Law Review and a 2020 Juris Doctor 
Candidate at Penn State Law. 
1 Thomas E. Carbonneau, ARBITRATION LAW IN A NUTSHELL 329, 330 (4th ed. 2017). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. at 330. 
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 331. 
6 Id. at 338-340. 
7 Supra note 1, at 338. 
8 Id. at 340. 
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nation’s legal scheme to protect its sovereignty while attempting to embrace arbitration 
and foreign investment.  
II. MEXICO’ ENERGY REFORM  
A. Historical Context 
For over 70 years, the Mexican State has operated under a policy of resource 
nationalism. Resource nationalism stands for the idea that the nation’s natural resources 
belong to the State and should solely serve its people.9 Under Article 27 of the Mexican 
Constitution,  
the Mexican nation alone [is authorized to] carry out all actions 
pertaining to the oil and gas industry without any work being 
performed by private companies, and secures the people of Mexico 
all water and land, including mineral rights.10  
Since 1938, the Mexican oil and gas sector has operated under this regime of 
resource nationalism.11 In 1938, Mexico’s president - Lazaro Cardenas - officially closed 
the oil and gas industry to foreign and private investors, which effectively gave the State 
all control over oil and gas exploration and production.12 Since then, the idea of sovereign 
power over the energy sector has become a part of Mexican culture.13 Mexican citizens 
celebrate the day that oil was made exclusive for the State. This national holiday is known 
as “El Dia de la Expropriacion Petrolera” or Oil Expropriation Day.14 Starting in the 1990s, 
however, the State’s economic means to explore and exploit oil and gas became more 
limited.15 In 2012, Mexico imported almost half the oil used in the country from foreign 
nations, and Mexico’s economy suffered greatly given its heavy dependence on the success 
 
9 Becky L. Jacobs and Brad Finney, Mexico’s Energy Regime Reforms: Rescission, Mitigation, And Dispute 
Resolution, 6 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES 149, at 150 (2017).  
10 Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, CPEUM, art 27, Diario Oficial de la Federacion 
[DOF] 05-02-1917 (Mex.). Translated in Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 151. 
11 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 152.  
12 Id. at 150. 
13 Randal C. Archibold & Elisabeth Malkin, Mexico’s Pride, Oil, May Be Opened to Outsiders, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/13/world/americas/mexico-oil.html.  
14 Id. See also Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 150. 
15 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 153. 
252 
 
of the energy sector.16 This predicament forced the Mexican government to consider 
opening the energy sector to private investors that could inject capital into the nation’s 
exploration and production of oil and gas.17 The high demand for oil and gas in Mexico 
and around the world presented a promising opportunity for the resource-rich nation. 
Private investors could provide the technology and capital to extract the resources that 
Mexico could not afford to exploit.18  
Approximately 75 years after the expropriation of oil and gas in Mexico, in 
December 2013, Mexico’s President– Enrique Pena Nieto (EPN) – signed the energy 
reform into law.19 This event effectively opened the energy sector in Mexico and ceased 
the national monopoly on oil and gas.20  
B. Arbitration in Mexico  
Latin-American countries have generally been unfriendly towards arbitration.21 
However, Mexico, since its adoption of arbitration in the 1990s, has become one of the 
leading Latin-American countries promoting and enforcing arbitration.22 In recent years, 
Mexican courts have reinforced arbitration. For instance, several Mexican courts have 
rendered decisions that protect arbitrators from being sued through an amparo action.23 An 
amparo action is a legal remedy, modeled after habeas corpus, and used to challenge 
“responsible authorities” for constitutional rights violations.24 Under amparo law, a 
 
16 Alejandro Lopez-Velarde & Philip D. Vasquez, Historic Break with the Past: The New Foreign Investment 
Possibilities in the Mexican Oil and Gas Industry, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153, 156-57 (2014).  
17 Shalanda H. Baker, Mexican Energy Reform, Climate Change, and Energy Justice in Indigenous 
Communities, 56 NAT. RESOURCES J. 2, at 371 (2016). 
18 Id. 
19 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 154. 
20 Fernando Cano-Lasa, Mexico Energy Reform: Dispute Resolution For Operators Facing Administrative 
Rescission Of Theirs Exploration and Production Agreements, 39 HOUS. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 6 (2017). 
21 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 331; see also Henry Burnett, Recent Developments in Key Latin American 
Jurisdictions To Attract International Commercial Arbitration, 5 Am. Univ. Bus. L. Rev. 3, at 388-89 (2015) 
(most Latin American jurisdictions did not codify arbitration as a method of dispute resolution until the 
twentieth century). 
22 See Geoffrey H. Bracken & Peter Scaff, Effective and Enforceable Dispute Resolution in U.S./Mexican 
Commercial Trade, 45 HOUS. L. 36, 37-38 (2007). 
23 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 338-340. 
24 Cecilia Flores, Does The New Amparo Law Threaten Arbitration in Mexico?, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 24, 2015), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/24/does-the-new-
amparo-law-threatens-arbitration-in-mexico/; see also Javier Navarro-Velasco, Salvador Fonseca-Gonzalez 
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“responsible authority” is usually equated to a governmental entity.25 In 2013, amendments 
to the amparo law in Mexico redefined the meaning of “responsible authority to include  
certain kinds of private parties:26              
The responsible authority, being held as such, despite of its formal 
nature, the one that pronounces, orders, enforces or attempts to 
enforce the act that creates, modifies, or terminates legal situations 
in a unilateral and obligatory manner; or fails to perform the act, that 
if performed, it would create, modify or terminate such legal 
situations. For the purpose of this Law, private parties will be held 
as a responsible authority when they perform acts equivalent to 
those of an authority, that affect rights in terms of this section, and 
whose functions are determined by a general law.27 
The inclusion of private parties within the meaning of “responsible authority” 
exposed arbitrators to amparo actions, such that a party to arbitration could sue an arbitrator 
for constitutional rights violations.28 Nonetheless, in 2015, Mexican courts addressed the 
threat to arbitration holding that arbitrators cannot be considered “responsible authorities” 
for purposes of amparo, because arbitrators are privately contracted by the parties and, 
therefore, do not perform acts equivalent to a governmental authority.29 The courts’ 
recognition of inapplicability of amparo claims against arbitrators reinforced the private 
nature of arbitration and set up precedent showing cooperative judicial behavior towards 
arbitration.30 The protection against amparo claims clarified the role of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, which Mexico incorporated in 1993 
as the law that ascertains the remedies against arbitrators in international commercial 
 
& Javier Navarro-Trevino, Mexico: Arbitrators not to be subject to amparo actions, GLOBAL ARBITRATION 
NEWS (April 30, 2018), https://globalarbitrationnews.com/mexico-arbitrators-not-subject-amparo-actions/. 
25 Javier Navarro-Velasco, Salvador Fonseca-Gonzalez & Javier Navarro-Trevino, Mexico: Arbitrators not 
to be subject to amparo actions, GLOBAL ARBITRATION NEWS (April 30, 2018), 
https://globalarbitrationnews.com/mexico-arbitrators-not-subject-amparo-actions/. 
26 Cecilia Flores, Does The New Amparo Law Threaten Arbitration in Mexico?, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER 
ARBITRATION BLOG (Oct. 24, 2015), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2015/10/24/does-the-new-
amparo-law-threatens-arbitration-in-mexico/. 
27 Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Articulos 103 y 107 de la Constitucion Politica de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos [LARACPEUM] art. 5, Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DOF] 02-04-2013 (Mex.). Translated in 
Flores, supra note 26. 
28 Flores, supra note 26. 
29 Id. (e.g. case 195/2014 in the Eight Collegiate Civil Court of the First Circuit). 
30 Navarro-Velasco, supra note 25. 
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disputes.31 In addition to UNCITRAL, Mexico is a member of a series of conventions that 
regulate international investment in oil and gas as well as dispute resolution, including the 
1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.32 Furthermore, in 2017, a new Mexican law dealing with alternative dispute 
resolution recognized the right to arbitrate as a constitutional right.33  
Nonetheless, the Mexican government has historically established certain 
limitations to the subject matter of arbitration. For example, criminal matters and amparo 
claims are by definition, inarbitrable under Mexican law.34  
III. CONTRACTS UNDER THE HYDROCARBONS LAW  
A. Hydrocarbons Law 
The regulation of the energy sector in Mexico falls exclusively under federal 
jurisdiction.35 The Hydrocarbons Law is federal legislation that largely controls investment 
contracts in the oil and gas sector, as well as the structure of the industry.36 And although 
the 2013 amendment effectively opened the sector’s doors to foreign and private investors, 
the Mexican federal government did not give up all of its previous sovereign control over 
the exploration and production of oil and gas.37  
Under the Hydrocarbons Law, private and foreign investors may enter into private 
agreements with the Mexican State or with the state-owned productive company – 
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) – in exchange for a license to the exploitation and 
 
31 Herfried Woss, Arbitration under the Mexican Energy Reform: The Lessons of COMMISA v. PEMEX, 
WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2014/11/07/arbitration-under-the-mexican-energy-reform-the-
lessons-of-commisa-v-pemex/.  
32 Carlos Ramos Miranda & Miguel Angel Mateo Simon, Mexico, THE LAW REVIEWS: THE OIL AND GAS 
LAW REVIEW - EDITION 4 (Dec. 2016), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/edition/the-oil-and-gas-law-review-
edition-4/1140336/mexico.  
33 Alejandro Lopez Ortiz and Gustavo Fernandes, A Year of Legal Developments for International Arbitration 
in Latin America, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Jan. 11, 2016), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/01/11/a-year-of-legal-developments-for-international-
arbitration-in-latin-america/. 
34 Gabriel Cavazos Villanueva, Arbitration and Investment Protection within the Context of the Energy 
Reform in Mexico: A First Approach based on COMMISA v. PEMEX and KBR v. Mexico, JAMES A. BAKER 
III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY: THE RULE OF LAW AND MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM (2017). 
35 Id.  
36 Cano-Lasa, supra note 20, at 9; see also Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL], Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-
11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-11-2016 (Mex.).  
37 Cano-Lasa, supra note 20, at 9. 
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production of oil and gas in Mexican territory.38 These licenses function like contracts, not 
like concessions, such that investors only obtain a share of the production.39 The 
Hydrocarbons Law sets up a series of rules and limitations that the contracting parties must 
follow when entering into an agreement. First, under Article 19, Section VIII, the 
Hydrocarbons Law requires the inclusion of an administrative rescission clause in oil and 
gas exploration and production contracts.40 Next, Article 20 lists the minimum 
circumstances for the invocation of administrative rescission:  
The Executive Branch, through the National Hydrocarbons 
Commission shall have the right to administratively rescind the 
Exploration and Production Agreements and recover the 
Contractual Area if any of the following serious conditions occur: I. 
That for more than one hundred and eighty calendar and continuous 
days, the Operator does not commence or suspends the activities 
included in the plan for the exploration or production of the 
contacting area, without due cause or approval form the National 
Hydrocarbons Commission. II. The Operator fails to comply with 
the minimum work commitment, without due cause as per the terms 
and conditions of the exploration and production agreement; III. If 
the Operator assigns totally or partially, the operation or the rights 
conferred in the exploration and production agreement without the 
corresponding prior approval as per the terms specified in Article 15 
of this Law; IV. The occurrence of a serious accident caused by the 
willful misconduct or negligence of the Operator, which causes 
damages to infrastructure, fatality and loss or production.41 
And lastly, Article 21 establishes the inarbitrability of the administrative rescission 
and the exclusive use of Mexican federal law for purposes of litigation:  
The controversies related to the Exploration and Extraction 
Contracts, except for the provisions of the preceding article, may be 
resolved through alternative mechanisms, including arbitration 
agreements in accordance with the provisions of Title IV Book V of 
 
38 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34; see also Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL], Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 
08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-11-2016 (Mex.). 
39 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
40 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art. 19, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/.  
41 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art. 20, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Cano-Lasa, supra note 20, at 20. 
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the Commercial Code, international treaties on arbitration, and 
dispute resolution to which Mexico is a party.  
The National Hydrocarbons Commission will not be governed, in 
any case, by foreign legislations. In any case, the arbitration 
procedure will observe the following:  
I. The applicable legislation will be the Federal Mexican Laws;  
II. The arbitration procedure will be conducted in Spanish; and  
III. The award shall be in strict law and shall be binding on both 
parties.42  
 These three articles are the source of discussion when it comes to determining 
Mexico’s policy on arbitration. Although together, Articles 20 and 21 seem to promote 
arbitration, the limitations imposed in Article 21 have greater consequences than may be 
seen in the face of the statute.43  
Under Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law, arbitration and other alternative dispute 
resolution methods are available to control over contractual disputes between the State and 
foreign/private investors for the exploration and production of oil and gas.44 The available 
methods of alternative dispute resolution are those included in the Mexican Commercial 
Code, and, in the case of arbitration, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration applies.45 Although oil and gas exploration and production 
contracts are subject to the Hydrocarbons Law, these contracts are governed by commercial 
law, as expressly stated in Article 92 of the Hydrocarbons Law:  
For matters not provided in this law, the acts of the Hydrocarbon 
industry will be deemed commercial acts, and will be governed by 
the Commercial Code, and by the Federal Civil Code as 
supplementary law.46  
The existence of arbitration provides security for the investors, as it allows them to 
have a level of control over their own destiny in case a dispute should arise with the 
 
42 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art. 21, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/.  
43 See supra, note 9, at 158-59. 
44 Ortiz & Fernandes, supra note 33.  
45 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 159. 
46 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art 92, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/.  
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Mexican government.47 Thus, arbitration in the context of the energy sector, incentivizes 
foreign investment in Mexico, which was the original goal of the energy reform.48  
B. The Administrative Rescission  
The Hydrocarbons Law allows private and foreign investors to enter into oil and 
gas exploration and production contracts with the Mexican government.49 For all purposes, 
these agreements function as commercial contracts, under commercial contract law, 
notwithstanding the limitations that the Hydrocarbons Law imposes.50  
Under Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law, contracts between the Mexican State 
and private investors must include an administrative rescission clause.51 The administrative 
rescission clause is a specific type of rescission that only the State, or State representative, 
may invoke, and the private party may only challenge an administrative rescission through 
judicial trial. In essence, when certain circumstances arise, an administrative rescission 
allows the State to unilaterally rescind contracts with private investors.52 Article 20 of the 
Hydrocarbons Law includes the minimum circumstances which allow the State to enact an 
administrative rescission.53 In summary, Article 20 gives the State permission to invoke 
the administrative rescission clause when the private party commits gross non-
performance.54 Accordingly, if any or all of the circumstances in Article 20 ensue and the 
State moves forward with an administrative rescission, the contract between the State and 
the private party becomes void.55 Paragraph 6 of Article 20 also establishes that after the 
invocation of an administrative rescission, the investor must transfer the “contract area” 
 
47 Carbonneau, supra note 1, at 339.  
48 Niki Mendoza, Mexico’s energy reforms: bearing fruit at last, FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 16, 2017, 
https://www.ft.com/content/2d540f64-793a-11e7-a3e8-60495fe6ca71.  
49 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 159. 
50 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art 92, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/.  
51 Id.  
52 Miguel Angel Marmolejo Cervantes, Administrative Rescission Clause in Hydrocarbons’ Exploration and 
Extraction Contracts, BLA BROKERAGE FIRM BUSINESS & LAW & APPRAISAL SERVICES BLOG (Dec. 18, 
2015, 8:21 PM), http://blaservices.com.mx/inicio/2015/12/18/administrative-rescission-clause-in-
hydrocarbons/. 
53 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art 20, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/. 
54 Woss, supra note 31. 
55 Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 52. 
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back to the State without receiving any compensation or payment,56 with the exception of 
sunk costs.57 
C. Arbitration under the Hydrocarbons Law  
Natural questions arise about the relationship of the administrative rescission clause 
and arbitration in agreements between the State and private investors. Commentators 
generally consider the Mexican government’s use of the administrative rescission to be an 
excessive imposition of authority over investors.58 Some even believe that the 
administrative rescission is clearly contrary to the foreign investment standards of 
treatment in international treaties, including the right to arbitration.59 Thus, commentators 
seem to agree that the Mexican State uses the arbitral procedure to favor the State over 
investors. For these reasons, commentators often find the administrative rescission to be 
divergent from the commercial nature of the Hydrocarbons Law.60  
Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law explicitly prohibits matters related to the 
administrative rescission from going to arbitration.61 In essence, if a dispute arises about 
whether the private party committed gross non-performance, which would trigger the 
option of administrative rescission, the dispute can only be decided by a Mexican federal 
court and according to Mexican federal law.62  
The Hydrocarbons Law was amended in 2014 to include the inarbitrability of the 
administrative rescission following an amendment to the Public-Private Partnerships Law 
in 2012, which established inarbitrability in matters dealing with any act of authority by a 
State entity.63 The idea of such exclusion was first brought up by a case in 1997 before the 
current Hydrocarbons Law was enacted, where Mexican courts addressed the precise 
 
56 Ley de Hidrocarburos [HL] art 20, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-
11-2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT 
IMPACT (June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/; see also David 
Alire Garcia, RPT-Though contract rescission clauses could blunt Mexican oil opening, REUTERS: ENERGY 
& OIL (July 1, 2015), https://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL2N0ZF1RY20150701. 
57 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
58 Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 52. 
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
61 Ley de Hidrocarburos art 21, Diario de la Federacion [DOF] 08-11-2014, ultimas reformas DOF 15-11-
2016 (Mex.). Translated in Mexico Hydrocarbons Law – English Translation, THOMPSON & KNIGHT IMPACT 
(June 2014), https://www.tklaw.com/mexico-hydrocarbons-law-english-translation/. 
62 Id ; see also Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
63 Id. 
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question of whether a dispute over the administrative rescission was a matter for the courts 
or arbitration.64  
In COMMISA v. PEMEX, PEMEX – a State agency - exercised administrative 
rescission to end the contractual relationship with COMMISA after a series of disputes, 
unrelated to the administrative rescission, had arisen between the parties.65 In response, 
COMMISA brought an amparo action against PEMEX claiming that the exercise of the 
administrative rescission was unconstitutional.66 Mexico’s Supreme Court effected its 
power to assume jurisdiction and delivered two important holdings on the issue.67 First, the 
Court held that the State’s application of administrative rescission in hydrocarbons 
contracts is constitutional.68 Second, the Court held that the State’s application of 
administrative rescission qualifies as an exercise of authority under amparo law, which 
renders the application of an administrative rescission inarbitrable.69  
By deeming the administrative rescission a valid exercise of authority under amparo 
law, COMMISA indirectly established the inarbitrability of the administrative rescission, 
because Mexican amparo law clearly prohibits arbitration of amparo claims.70 Any 
objection to an administrative rescission would, thus, be inarbitrable, making the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate superfluous,71 and increasing the possibility that the State will 
invoke an administrative rescission for arbitrary reasons.72   
This tension has not been relieved, but was made explicit in Article 21 of the 
Hydrocarbons Law even though courts are poorly prepared to rule on such matters, as 
judges are rarely experts in the field of exploration and production of oil and gas.73 
Nonetheless, neither the COMMISA outcome nor the enactment of Article 21 come as a 
surprise considering the sovereign meaning that the energy sector carries in Mexico.74  
 
64 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
65 Id.; see also Ortiz & Fernandes, supra note 33. 
66 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
67 Id.  
68 Id.  
69 Id.   
70 Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 52. 
71 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34; see also Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 51; Woss, supra note 31. 
72 Sergio A. de la Torre Servin de la Mora, Contratos para la exploracion y produssion: La inquietante 
recision administrativa de los mismos, OIL & GAS MAGAZINE (Oct. 22, 2014), 
https://oilandgasmagazine.com.mx/2014/10/contratos-para-la-exploracion-y-produccion-la-inquietante-
rescision-administrativa-de-los-mismos/#sthash.FSugaBdI.dpuf.  
73 Woss, supra note 31. 
74 Jacobs & Finney, supra note 9, at 152. 
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One party in arbitration agreements usually holds greater power and influence over 
the arbitration.75 In fact, States in the United States have tried to compensate the weaker 
party by implementing special laws, but the States’ efforts have been continuously opposed 
by the federal government arguing that such laws impose an unfair burden on arbitration, 
and thus, contradict the federal policy on arbitration and the parties’ freedom of contract.76 
Accordingly, there is a certain amount of disparate power between the parties that has been 
accepted to protect the right to arbitrate, at least so in the United States.77  
The contract scheme imposed by the Mexican Hydrocarbons Law is also 
based on disparate power between the parties, in this case, to favor the State.78 But contrary 
to the scheme in the United States, where the powerful party has an advantage in 
arbitration, here, the Mexican State has an advantage because it can choose to forego 
arbitration.79 Since the administrative rescission is inarbitrable under the Hydrocarbons 
Law, Mexico’s courts have the sole power to decide when the administrative rescission 
applies.80 In other words, the Mexican federal courts decide whether the private party 
violated its agreement with the State under Article 20 of the Hydrocarbons Law. This 
policy renders the federal law permitting arbitration inoperable because, in every dispute, 
the Mexican State can invoke an administrative rescission and wait for the court to 
adjudicate.81 
The current structure of the Hydrocarbons Law goes against the parties’ agreement 
to arbitrate and also against Article 21 of the Hydrocarbons Law.82 Nonetheless, the 
Hydrocarbons Law is likely designed such that investors will seemingly run lower 
investment risk when in actuality, the State maintains almost full discretion regarding the 
exploration and production of oil and gas.  
 
 
75 Jeremy McManus, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration Law: How to Remedy the Abuses 
Consumers Face When Arbitrating Disputes, 37 B.C.J.L. & SOC. JUST. 177, 186 (2017). 
76 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (Implementing a state consumer protection 
law). 
77 McManus, supra note 75, at 186. 
78 De la Torre Servin de la Mora, supra note 72. 
79 Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 52. 
80 Id.  
81 Cavazos Villanueva, supra note 34. 
82 Marmolejo Cervantes, supra note 52. 
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IV. IMPACT ON MEXICO’S ENERGY REFORM 
A. Reaction of Foreign Investors to Mexico’s Superior Control Over Contracts 
Pursuant to the energy reform, the Hydrocarbons Law was written to boost the 
nation’s economy.83 Investors would benefit from new opportunities and the State would 
benefit from the economic reinvigoration that such investors would bring into the 
country.84 However, the parties’ power imbalance in oil and gas exploration and production 
contracts brings concerns to some investors.85 The contractual scheme set up under the 
Hydrocarbons Law grants more power to the State than to investors.86 The State’s finance 
is not put at risk, but that of private investors.87 Therefore, the contractual relationship 
between the State and the investor should award the investor more power to reduce the 
imbalance between the parties. Arbitration precisely serves to decrease the investor’s risk 
when investing in the exploration and production of oil and gas in Mexican territory.88  
However, the administrative rescission clause required under the Hydrocarbons 
Law introduced a way for the State to regain all the power in the contractual relationship 
because the mere existence of an administrative rescission clause coupled with its subject 
matter inarbitrability renders the arbitral clause ineffectual.89 Consequently, arbitration as 
a tool to minimize investment risk is unsuccessful in contracts for exploration and 
production of oil and gas in Mexico.90  
The inarbitrability of administrative rescission has not driven away all investors.91 
According to a Houston-based oil sector lawyer, the risk of facing an inarbitrable 
administrative rescission is more significant for smaller companies with lower risk 
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thresholds.92 Nonetheless, all investors have to be very cautious about avoiding acts that 
could trigger the administrative rescission under the Hydrocarbons Law.93 
Undoubtedly, investors will be hesitant to invest in a country that imposes 
limitations on arbitration and presents uncertainty in dispute resolution.94 Investment 
cutbacks in the energy sector will not only affect the investors business but will have an 
effect on the nation’s energy security, which relies on the success of the exploration and 
production of oil and gas.95 Therefore, a fair balance of power between investors and the 
State in exploration and production of oil and gas contracts is in the best interest of both 
parties.  
One could assume, that investors were willing to take the risk of facing an 
inarbitrable administrative rescission under the previous government, because of a 
multitude of signals demonstrating the state’s willingness to open its industries to foreign 
investors and adhere to risk mitigation measures.96 With a political climate prone to 
reforms and seeking the benefits of international trade, the risk of administrative rescission 
was one investors were willing to bear.97 Under the new president-elect, however, the 
administrative recession clause might prove to be the Achilles heel of invested foreign 
entities. 
B. The Newly Elected Mexican President  
On August of this year, 2018, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO) won the 
presidential election in Mexico and will officially assume the presidency on December 1, 
2018.98 Although AMLO belonged to different political parties throughout his multiple 
presidential campaigns, his position remained consistent against neo-liberal policies and in 
favor of populism.99 His populist and often controversial views lost him the presidency 
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twice, until this past election.100 AMLO’s populist ideas provoke fear of outsiders, 
especially when those outsiders are international investors coming into one of the country’s 
most important sectors.101  
Throughout his political career, AMLO has been vocal about his opposition to 
Mexico’s energy reform.102 In fact, AMLO based his presidential campaign partly on a 
resource nationalistic agenda.103 During his campaign, AMLO even stated that he would 
not permit the nation’s oil “to return to foreign hands.”104  
Nonetheless, AMLO is known as a pragmatic populist, and as such, there have been 
some conflicting statements regarding AMLO’s position about the energy sector.105 On 
one hand, AMLO’s advisers apparently met with American investors to assure them that 
the energy sector in Mexico would remain open.106 On the other hand, AMLO stated that 
measures would be taken to assess each existing oil and gas exploration and production 
contract between the State and private investors.107  
 Given the conflicting opinions, it is impossible to predict what AMLO will do to 
the energy reform once he assumes the presidency, but the administrative rescission might 
give AMLO the means to change the course of the national resources politics towards more 
protectionism and resource nationalism, without even a breach of contract.108 One could 
further assume that independently of the path AMLO will choose in the coming months, 
investment contracts in the oil and gas industry are likely to regress as investors will be 
more cautious and less likely to bear the risk of an inarbitrable administrative rescission 
clause.109  
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C. Comparative Analysis: Venezuela  
Venezuela holds one of the world’s largest oil reserves and during the time when 
Venezuela reached its highest level of oil production in 1998, the nation had invited 
international investors to participate in the nation’s oil production.110 In 2007, however, 
Hugo Chavez demanded changes to oil production agreements between the Venezuelan 
government and foreign investors that would increase the government’s control over the 
contracts.111 The demand came after oil prices increased, so Chavez undertook a 
nationalistic approach to protect the Venezuelan people.112 As a result of the modifications, 
the Venezuelan government expropriated oil companies that refused to accept the changes, 
including oil titans like ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips.113 In addition, Venezuela 
denunciated its membership to ICSID, which imposed further obstacles for private 
investors.114 Thereafter, from 1998 until 2015, Venezuela’s production of oil decreased by 
approximately 30% and does not show any favorable signs for the near future.115 
Venezuela’s plummeting oil prices resulted in hyperinflation and, today, Venezuela is in 
crisis with many people attempting to flee the country to survive.116  
Venezuela’s history and current state should serve as a message to Mexico that imposing 
limitations on international oil and gas investment is not always the most beneficial for the 
local economy and welfare. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Consistent with Mexico’s traditional resource nationalism policy, and the 
entrenched culture of protecting the oil in its territory, Mexico has set some limits to its 
historically arbitration-friendly attitude. Nonetheless, foreign investors have not been 
deterred from investing in Mexico’s energy sector, and Mexico’s future in the oil and gas 
industry seems promising, but this growth is now at risk due to politics. 
A nation’s international investment policy is often affected by politics, and 
currently, Mexico’s government is undergoing a drastic political change. AMLO’s election 
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will likely bring turbulence to arbitration in Mexico, especially international arbitration in 
the energy sector. AMLO’s populist approach could incentivize the federal government to 
use the arbitration loophole that the administrative rescission offers to push out foreign 
investors from the Mexican oil and gas industry without explicitly violating any 
agreements. Such an act would result in Mexico essentially following the footsteps of 
Chavez in Venezuela.  
Therefore, Mexican legislators must fight against a reform rollback, which would 
not only cause Mexico’s arbitration policy to digress but would also fracture Mexico’s 
already fragile relationships with foreign investors.  
